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crime, insecurity and erosion of 
democratic values in latin america
Orlando J. Pérez1 (Estados Unidos)
Abstract: In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, 
political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, 
and the associated fear of crime, is helping to build popular support 
for repressive measures, and by extension, for repressive regimes. 
In short, is it possible that growing crime is a threat to the durability 
of democracy in Latin America? To test this proposition, this paper 
uses the 2008 Americas Barometer surveys. The premise of the paper 
is that rising crime and insecurity undermine democratic values and 
increase support for authoritarian measures. As crime rates increase 
and governments fail to stem the tide, citizen’s belief that democracy 
is the best system may decline. Some citizens may support the imple-
mentation of greater controls or extra-judicial measures. High levels 
of crime may reduce levels of tolerance and interpersonal trust, thus 
undermining social capital. Finally, crime victimization and the fear 
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of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, 
particularly the police and judicial authorities.
síntesis: En el contexto latinoamericano de alta delincuencia, 
los datos de la Organización Mundial de la Salud indican que la re-
gión es la más violenta del mundo. Politólogos y políticos necesitan 
preguntarse si el crimen y el temor de ser víctima de la delincuen-
cia incentivan o no el apoyo popular a medidas represivas y, por 
extensión, a regímenes represivos. ¿Es posible que la delincuencia 
constituya una amenaza creciente a la durabilidad de la democra-
cia en América Latina? Para intentar responder esta pregunta, este 
trabajo utiliza las encuestas del Barómetro de las Américas realiza-
das en el año 2008. La premisa de este trabajo es que la creciente 
delincuencia y la inseguridad socavan los valores democráticos y 
aumentan el apoyo a medidas autoritarias. A medida que aumenten 
los índices de criminalidad, y si los gobiernos no logran detener la 
ola de violencia, puede llegar a disminuir entre los ciudadanos la 
creencia de que la democracia es el mejor sistema político posible. 
Para enfrentar la violencia, los ciudadanos pueden apoyar la aplica-
ción de controles extrajudiciales o extraconstitucionales. Los altos 
niveles de delincuencia pueden reducir los niveles de tolerancia y la 
confianza interpersonal, lo que socava el capital social. Por último, 
la victimización y el temor a la delincuencia podrían conducir a los 
ciudadanos a perder confianza en sus instituciones políticas, en 
particular hacia las autoridades policiales y judiciales.
1. Introduction
Crime and insecurity have emerged as critical issues in 
Latin America and the rest of the developing world. Studies 
have shown that citizens view crime as one of the most 
pressing problems facing their nation (Quann and Hung, 
2002). Despite the significance of the issue the link between 
crime and democracy has not been examined extensively 
in a comparative perspective (Beirne, 1997; Newman and 
Pridemore, 2000; Pérez, 2003; Prillaman, 2003).
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Figure 1 presents data that shows that Latin America has 
the dubious distinction of having the highest rates of crime 
and violence in the world (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 
2008). Violence in Latin America is five times higher than in 
most other places in the world (Fajnzylber, Lederman and 
Loayza, 1998). Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, 
the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin 
America, but also the differences with the rest of the world 
are growing larger (Gaviria and Pagés, 1999).
Figure 1. Intentional Homicide Rates per 100,000 
Inhabitants by Region and Sub-Region2
Coinciding with the recent wave of crime in Latin 
America, the last two decades have seen the rise of a new 
form of repressive policing called mano dura, or “strong 
hand,” as well as relative high levels of support for au-
thoritarian measures. As Orlando J. Pérez explains: “Crime 
2 Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008), Global Burden of Armed Violence 
Report, Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development. On 
line: www.genevadeclaration.org. 
64 Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 1
undermines support for democratic regimes. As crime rates 
increase, pressure mounts for ‘strong’ government action 
which in many instances results in highly repressive and 
undemocratic measures” (2003, p. 638).
At its core, mano dura necessitates curtailing individual 
rights and re-empowering the military and police. These 
sets of policies normally include deploying the military 
for internal policing, in addition to lengthening prison 
sentences, suspending due process guarantees and other 
protections for alleged criminals, and aggressively arresting 
youths suspected of gang membership.
The evidence shows that criminal activity has not been 
disrupted by these strategies; instead, gangs and other 
criminal networks have increased their level of organiza-
tion, technological sophistication, and international links. 
Moreover, because mano dura policies have lead to the 
incarceration of growing numbers of at-risk youth, they have 
created prison conditions that facilitate the organization of 
prison gangs, and that increase youths’ risk for continuing 
involvement in gang-related activities.3
Some authors suggest that fear of violent crime drives 
citizens to demand punitive and repressive measures against 
alleged criminals (Sanjuán, 2003), often in the form of 
“mano dura” policies. Fear can generate demand for strong 
governance, leading to support for authoritarianism and 
dictatorship (Corradi, 1992, pp. 267-292). Concern about 
violent crime in Latin America appears to be so severe that 
citizens are “willing to sacrifice certain liberties in order 
to feel more secure” (Tulchin and Ruthenberg, 2006, p. 5). 
Pérez found that in El Salvador up to 55% of the population 
3 In El Salvador alone, police records show that some 60,000 young peo-
ple were jailed as a result of the mano dura policies. Salvadoran police 
estimate that more than 10,000 of some 14,000 suspected gang members 
arrested in 2005 were later released for lack of evidence against them. 
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could support a military coup if there were high levels of 
crime (2003). In Africa, for example, fear of crime also has 
been associated with decreased support for democracy 
(Kuenzi, 2006). Furthermore, studies have found that vic-
timization (measured by fear and burglary victimization) 
undermines interpersonal trust (Brehm and Rahn, 1997).
In the seminal work on the breakdown of democratic 
regimes, Juan Linz defines legitimacy as “the belief that 
in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political 
institutions are better than any others that might be estab-
lished...” (1978, p. 16). According to Linz, the “efficacy” and 
“effectiveness” of the political system play a major role in 
determining its legitimacy. When the inability to formulate 
or implement adequate policies combines with a disloyal 
opposition, democratic governments tend to collapse (27-
38). To the extent that individuals view the job performed 
by democratic governments as effective, they will be less 
inclined to support extra-constitutional measures and an 
increased role for the armed forces. However, when legiti-
macy declines citizens may be receptive to new political 
alternatives, even those that would undermine democracy.
This paper examines the link between crime and in-
security and democratic values. As crime rates increase 
and governments fail to stem the tide, citizen’s belief that 
democracy is the best system may decline. Some citizens 
may support the implementation of greater controls or extra-
judicial measures. High levels of crime may reduce levels of 
tolerance and interpersonal trust, thus undermining social 
capital. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime 
could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions.
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2. Data
The data used in this study come from the 
AmericasBarometer series, involving face-to face interviews 
conducted in nations of North, Central and South America 
and the Caribbean in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010; analysis 
in this paper will focus on the 2008 data. The surveys were 
all carried out with uniform sample and questionnaire 
designs under the auspices of the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. The 
samples were all national and stratified by region and sub-
stratified by urban/rural. For purposes of our analysis each 
national sample has been weighted equally to represent an 
N of 1500.4 For purposes of this analysis I will be focusing 
on a subset of countries in the series: Mexico, Guatemala, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Uruguay.
The paper uses a series of OLS regression analyses to 
examine the impact of crime and fear of crime on a series of 
important democratic values. The dependent variables will 
include four key measures of democratic values: support 
for democracy, legitimacy of key institutions, interpersonal 
trust, and rights of the opposition to full participation. An 
appendix details the operationalization of the dependent 
and independent variables.
3. Victimization and Perception of Insecurity
First, using the survey data, I want to contextualize 
further the scale of the crime problem. The survey asked: 
“AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree 
4 The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.
edu/lapop/datasets.
Revista LatinoameRicana de opinión púbLica / númeRo 1 67
usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora rep-
resenta una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? 
[Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho, (2) Algo, (3) Poco, (4) Nada, 
(8) NS / NR”. To what extent do citizens believe crime a 
major problem for the nation’s wellbeing?5
Figure 2. Crime is a Threat to Nation’s Wellbeing
Figure 2 shows overwhelming support for the idea that 
crime is a major threat to the wellbeing of the nation. In 
nearly all the countries, the average score on the scale is 
5 Responses have been mathematically altered so as to represent a scale 
from 0-100, where 0 meaning that crime is not a threat and 100 a major 
(or a lot) threat to the wellbeing of the nation. This is done by recoding 
responses as 4=0, 3=33, 2=66, and 1=100. Similar transformations are 
made with other variables in order to develop scales that can be used 
in regression analysis and to improve the illustration of data.
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well above 70. There is scant difference between 12 of the 
20 countries in the analysis. Statistically there seems to be 2 
distinct groups, and Honduras as an outlier. Honduras is an 
interesting case as one of the most violent countries in the 
region but exhibiting a relatively low score. It is beyond the 
purview of this paper to go much further with the analysis 
of Honduras, except to say that a score of 74.3 is still quite 
high and only seems small relative to the other countries. 
The countries with the highest scores on the scale –about 
90– are El Salvador and Brazil. El Salvador is among the 
most violent countries in the region, with the former hav-
ing the highest homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in 
the hemisphere.
Figure 3 shows the extent to which respondents fear 
becoming victims of crime in their neighborhood:6 here 
we see an interesting difference with the almost universal 
results presented in Figure 2. While virtually all respondents 
believe crime a major threat to the nation’s well-being, 
Figure 3 shows that only in Peru do we find a majority 
of citizens, 51.7, that express fear of becoming victims of 
crime in their neighborhood. A possible explanation for the 
difference between evaluations of the national threat and 
conditions in the neighborhood is that for many citizens 
their neighborhood is the area they know the best, where 
their family and friends live, and in many cases a place they 
have lived for most of their lives. Additionally, even in the 
most violent society only a small minority of citizens ever 
experience crime directly.
6 The exact question used: AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia 
donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un 
asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o 
muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro, (2) Algo seguro, (3) Algo inseguro, (4) 
Muy inseguro, (8) NS / NR.
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Figure 3. Perception of Insecurity
Irrespective of the rankings, at least a third of respon-
dents across Latin America express fear of being victims 
of crime in their neighborhood and in most countries are 
near or above 40 on a scale of 0-100.7
Figure 4 shows the percentage of respondents that 
reported being victims of crime at least once during the 
previous 12 months.8
7 Evidence from the AmericasBarometer on the United States and Cana-
da, not shown, indicate that barely a fifth of respondents in those two 
nations express fear of being victims of crime. 
8 The exact question was: VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted 
víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí 
[siga], (2) No [pasar a VIC20], (8) NS / NR [pasar a VIC20].
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Figure 4. Crime Victimization
The levels of victimization range from a fourth of the 
population in the case of Peru to slightly more than 1 in 
eight citizens for Honduras.9 The chart shows three groups 
of countries: (1) Those with levels of victimization above 
20% such as Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and Ecuador; (2) 
Bolivia and El Salvador with levels just below 20%; and 
(3) the rest of the countries ranging between 17.1% for 
Guatemala and 13.7% for Honduras.
9 It is worth noting that levels of self-reported victimization are subject to a 
number of caveats. First, respondents’ memories may not be completely 
accurate, either because of non-reporting or false reporting. Second, 
the results are subject to the inherent problems associated with survey 
research, namely random and non-random errors. 
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4. Crime and Democracy
Now I turn to examining the impact of crime and per-
ceptions of insecurity on democratic values. Table 1 shows 
the results of a series of regression equations that examine 
the impact of crime victimization and insecurity when other 
variables are held constant.10 The results indicate that crime 
victimization has a positive impact on the willingness to sup-
port the right of the opposition to participate. This means that 
those respondents who have been victims of crime tend to 
exhibit higher levels of support for the right of the opposition. 
These results require further analysis beyond the purview 
of this paper; however, they may reflect the fact that victims 
of crime may generally become more active politically and 
thus would naturally be more supportive of the rights of the 
opposition since presumably many of them represent the 
opposition. Crime victimization has a negative impact on 
the legitimacy of key institutions. Those respondents that 
were victims of crime are significantly less likely to express 
confidence in the key institutions of the state.
Insecurity is an even more significant factor than crime 
victimization. Those individuals who are more fearful of 
becoming victims of crime in their neighborhood are less 
willing to extend rights to the opposition, have significantly 
lower interpersonal trust, lower support for the idea that 
democracy is the best political system, and exhibit far less 
confidence in political institutions.
10 In order to account for the effect of each case, the analysis includes a 
series of dummy variables. Mexico is the reference case. For each res-
pondent a variable is created measured as “1” if the person is from that 
country or “0” if they are not. By including the country dummy variables 
we account for the impact that are “fixed” for each respondent. When 
using this technique we must assign one set of dummy variables as 
reference, in this case it is Mexico. Therefore, each country coefficient 
measures the variance and statistical significance in relation to Mexico.
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In order to further illustrate the results of the regres-
sion analysis, I employ bivariate graphs which show the 
relationship between fear from and victimization by crime 
on key democratic variables.11
Figure 5. Perception of Insecurity and Democratic Values
Figure 5 shows the effect of insecurity on key demo-
cratic values. The impact on support for democracy and 
right of participation is fairly small; although the regression 
analysis does indicate that the effect is statistically signifi-
cant and in the expected direction. Support for democracy 
declines from an average level of 72.5 to around 70. The 
impact of insecurity on the right of participation is more 
11 The results presented in the graphs are for the pooled sample; indivi-
dual countries may present different patterns of relationship since each 
independent and dependent variable will interact somewhat differently 
depending on national context. 
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pronounced than for support for democracy with a drop 
from an average of 71 to just below 68 on the scale of 0-100.
In the case of interpersonal trust the impact of inse-
curity is dramatic. Figure 5 shows a precipitous drop in 
interpersonal trust for those citizens who feel insecure 
in their neighborhood. Interpersonal trust drops from an 
average of 70 to less than 50, a 20 point drop. Interpersonal 
trust is an important component to building social capital 
which in turn is important for the development of a robust 
civil society. The fact that insecurity affects the trust that 
citizens have in each other in such a dramatic way should 
be of significant concern given the rising trend of violence 
and crime in Latin America. Clearly, those nation’s that 
suffer from high levels of crime and where citizens are 
most fearful of being victims of crime will find it difficult 
to build stable and strong civil society.
Figure 6. Legitimacy of institutions and crime victimization
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Figure 6 shows the impact of crime victimization on 
the legitimacy of key state institutions. The graph shows 
that those individuals who have been victims of a crime 
in the previous year express significantly lower confidence 
in state institutions.
Finally, how does crime affect support for repressive 
actions? The survey asked a series of questions about re-
spondents’ willingness to support a military coup under 
various circumstances, including high levels of crime. The 
questions were worded as follows:
Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstan-
cias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En 
su opinión, ¿se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de Estado por los militares 
frente a las siguientes circunstancias…? [Leer alternativas después de cada 
pregunta]:
JC4. Frente a muchas 
protestas sociales.
(1) Se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder.
(2) No se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder.
(8) NS/
NR
JC10. Frente a mucha 
delincuencia.
(1) Se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder.
(2) No se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder.
(8) NS/
NR
JC12. Frente a la alta 
inflación, con aumento 
excesivo de precios.
(1) Se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder.
(2) No se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder.
(8) NS/
NR
JC13. Frente a mucha 
corrupción.
(1) Se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder.
(2) No se justificaría 
que los militares 
tomen el poder.
(8) NS/
NR
Figure 7 shows the percentages of respondents who 
support a coup under various circumstances.12 The graph 
shows that high levels of crime and corruption are the 
two reasons under which citizens would support a coup 
in greater numbers.
12 Note that the questions about coup support where not asked in all 
countries.
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Figure 7. Support for military coup 
under Various Conditions
With the exception of Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Brazil, and the Dominican Republic majorities of citizens 
in the rest of the countries analyzed here are willing to 
support military coups under conditions of high levels of 
crime. In Honduras and Mexico, for example, well over 
60% of respondents justify military coups if there is a lot 
of crime. Of course, these findings do not mean that those 
citizens prefer military-led governments or would auto-
matically support a coup. But the fact that such significant 
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numbers could find justifications for a military take-over 
should concern everyone who is interested in promoting 
democratic governance in the region. More to the point, 
it represents a large majority of citizens whose concern 
over crime is so significant they are willing to support an 
alternative political system.
So what are the factors that explain support for military 
coups under high levels of crime? Here, our dependent 
variable is the measure of support for military coups under 
conditions of high levels of crime and our independent vari-
ables include the traditional socio-demographic variables, 
along with a series of attitudinal variables measuring trust 
in the armed forces, support for democracy, presidential 
job approval, political tolerance, and interpersonal trust, as 
well as crime victimization and perception of insecurity.13 
Figure 8 shows graphically the results of the regression 
analysis.14 The figure illustrates the results of the regression 
analysis though the use of confidence intervals. Statistical 
significance is graphically represented by a confidence 
interval that does not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 
or better). When the dot, which represents the predicted 
impact of that variable, falls to the right of the vertical “0” 
line it implies a positive relationship whereas if it falls to the 
left it indicates a negative contribution. Appendix 2 shows 
the full results with regression coefficients.
13 The appendix displays how the independent variables are measured.
14 The analysis includes a series of dummy variables accounting for the 
fixed effects of each country (not shown for clarity). For each respondent 
a variable is created measured as “1” if the person is from that country 
or “0” if they are not. By including the country dummy variables we 
account for the impact that is “fixed” for each respondent. When using 
this technique we must assign one set of dummy variables as reference, 
in this case it is Mexico. Therefore, each country coefficient measures 
the variance and statistical significance in relation to Mexico. The full 
analysis, with the country dummy variable, can be seem in Appendix 2.
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Figure 8 Determinants of Support for Military 
Coup when High Levels of Crime
The regression results indicate that age, gender, and 
education are all statistically significant. Younger, females, 
and less educated respondents are more inclined to sup-
port military coups when there is high crime. Wealth is 
not statistically significant. All the attitudinal variables 
included in the analysis are statistically significant, and in 
the expected direction. On the one hand, the more support 
for the political system, tolerance, presidential approval, 
interpersonal trust, and support for democracy, the less 
support for military coups. On the other hand, the more 
trust respondents’ exhibit toward the armed forces the 
more support for military coups. Crime victimization and 
perception of insecurity also are statistically significant and 
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in the expected direction: those citizens who have expe-
rienced crime directly and those who are more fearful of 
being victims of crime are more likely to support military 
coups. Not surprisingly, the greatest impact seems to be 
exerted by opinions toward the armed forces.
Figure 9 shows the linear relation between trust in the 
armed forces and support for coup d’état under conditions 
of high levels of crime. Support for coups increases signifi-
cantly as trust in the armed forces increases. The difference 
in support for coups is close to 20 points between those 
individuals that have low trust in the armed forces and 
those who have high levels of trust.
Figure 9 Trust in the Armed Forces and Support for 
Coup d’état under Conditions of High Crime
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5. Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of crime and 
insecurity on democratic values in Latin America. Crime 
and violence are significant problems in the region. Latin 
America has the highest homicide rate in the world, and 
crime has led to the adoption of repressive policies includ-
ing the increasing use of the military.
The paper has shown that crime erodes democratic 
values. Crime victimization reduces the legitimacy of state 
institutions. Particularly important is the effects of percep-
tions of insecurity. The fear of becoming a victim of crime 
significantly erodes support for democracy as the best 
system, reduces support for the political legitimacy of key 
state institutions, and decreases support for the participa-
tion of the opposition. Additionally, substantial majorities in 
many countries of the region are willing to support military 
coups if there are high levels of crime.
The paper has found that younger, less educated, and 
women are more likely to support military coups when there 
are high levels of crime. Key attitudinal variables such as 
support for democracy, greater political tolerance, inter-
personal trust, and greater support for the extant political 
system and for the job the sitting president is doing are all 
statistically significant factors in determining support for 
military coups. Additionally, crime victims and those who 
fear becoming victims also serve to determine support for 
military coups.
In the last 25 years Latin America has witnessed a re-
markable transformation, from military dictatorship and 
revolution, to institutional democracy, competitive party 
systems, and more open societies. However, while there is 
much to be hopeful about, the specter of the military still 
lingers. To the extent that elected civilian governments are 
unable to deal effectively with the myriad of social problems 
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facing their countries –crime principally among them– the 
legitimacy of democracy vis-à-vis authoritarianism will di-
minish. On the one hand, the loss of legitimacy may lead to 
public clamoring for the “strong” leadership of the military. 
A deeper concern is that the militaries of some countries 
may take public discontent with their current governments’ 
effectiveness in fighting crime as a green light to expand 
their reach into more areas of domestic politics.
While additional analysis is needed to examine other 
aspects of the connection between crime and democratic 
values, such as whether there are different effects depending 
on the crime experienced or examination of the impact on 
other values such as support for populism, the evidence 
presented in this paper demonstrates an alarming link be-
tween increasing violence and erosion of democratic values.
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Appendix 1. measurement of Variables
Support for democracy: NG4. Puede que la democracia 
tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma 
de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en des-
acuerdo con esta frase?
Interpersonal trust: IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gen-
te de aquí, diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer 
alternativas] 1) Muy confiable, 2) Algo confiable, 3) Poco 
confiable, 4) Nada confiable.
Legitimacy of Institutions: Scale developed from the 
following three items: B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene con-
fianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?; B10A. ¿Hasta qué 
punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?; B31. ¿Hasta 
qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de 
Justicia?; B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el 
Congreso Nacional?; B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza 
usted en los partidos políticos?
Right of Participation: Scale developed from the fo-
llowing three items: E5. Que las personas participen en 
manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Con qué firmeza 
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usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?; E8. Que las personas par-
ticipen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver 
los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Con qué firmeza usted 
aprobaría o desaprobaría?; E11. Que las personas trabajen 
en campañas electorales para un partido político o candi-
dato. ¿Con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría?
Education: ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza 
que usted completó o aprobó?
Gender: Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre, 
(2) Mujer.
Age: Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos?
Crime victim: VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha 
sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los 
últimos 12 meses?
Perception of Insecurity: AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o 
barrio / colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posi-
bilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted 
muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?
Trust in Armed Forces: B12 ¿Hasta qué punto tiene 
confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?
Wealth: Measured as a scale of possession of capital 
goods
Presidential job approval: M1. Y hablando en general 
del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está 
realizando el Presidente [NOMBRE PRESIDENTE ACTUAL] 
es...?:
System support: Scale composed of the following 5 ques-
tions: B1 ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales 
de justicia de (país) garantizan un juicio justo?; B2. ¿Hasta 
qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones polí-
ticas de (país)?; B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los 
derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por 
el sistema político (país)?; B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente 
usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político (país)?; 
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B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al 
sistema político (país)?
Political Tolerance: Scale composed of the following 
4 questions: D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal 
de la forma de gobierno de (país), no sólo del gobierno 
de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza 
aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas 
personas?; D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba 
usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifesta-
ciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de 
vista?; D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la 
forma de gobierno de (país). ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o 
desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse 
para cargos públicos?; D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o 
desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión 
para dar un discurso?
Appendix 2. Regression equation for Support for 
military Coups under Conditions of High Crime
Dependent Variable: Coup support high levels of crime
Coefficient t
Age -0.095* (-10.88)
Gender 0.036* (4.95)
Support for Democracy -0.051* (-5.42)
Trust in Armed Forces 0.132* (13.14)
Perception of Insecurity 0.045* (4.94)
Education -0.056* (-5.24)
System Support -0.032* (-2.88)
Political Tolerance -0.044* (-4.76)
Interpersonal Trust -0.030* (-3.34)
Presidential Job Approval -0.068* (-6.84)
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Crime Victim 0.032* (4.14)
Wealth -0.021 (-1.86)
El Salvador -0.042* (-3.56)
Dominican Republic -0.108* (-8.99)
Venezuela -0.116* (-7.60)
Uruguay -0.109* (-8.11)
Brazil -0.088* (-5.77)
Peru -0.044* (-3.23)
Bolivia -0.131* (-7.34)
Ecuador -0.116* (-6.39)
Nicaragua -0.069* (-4.81)
Honduras -0.012 (-0.83)
Guatemala -0.063* (-4.61)
Constant 0.042* (3.66)
R-Squared 0.075
Number of Obs. 17339
* p<0.05
